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ABSTRACT 
The political union of southern Slavs in the multiethnic state of Yugoslavia came 
to a violent end in the 1990s. The joint Serbo–Croatian language also ceased to exist as 
an official language when the Yugoslav successor states Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia 
identified only Bosnian, Croatian and Serbian as their respective official languages. 
Language use in these states became a political tool used to emphasize the differences 
among the ethnicities and to gauge ethnic loyalty. Croatia endeavored to “cleanse” its 
language of any characteristics in common with the joint Serbo–Croatian language. 
Serbian nationalists rejected the Latin alphabet and insisted on using the Cyrillic 
alphabet.  Bosniaks recognized a Bosnian language that was not acknowledged by 
Bosnia’s ethnic Croats or ethnic Serbs. While language previously had been a means to 
unite Balkan Slavs, it became an instrument of nationalism wielded by politically 
motivated actors to widen the division among the ethnicities. Language disputes did not 
destroy Yugoslavia, but they may hinder recovery and modernization.  As each Yugoslav 
successor state strives toward integration into the European Union, political questions 
concerning language may polarize domestic politics and inhibit regional cooperation, 
thereby hampering efforts to carry out needed economic and political reforms. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
The multiethnic state of Yugoslavia came into existence after the First World 
War, when southern Slavs united in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes.  The 
Yugoslav Kingdom remained only until the Second World War, but the union remained 
intact under communist rule.  After the death in 1980 of its strong leader, Josip Broz Tito, 
the differences that were partially suppressed after World War II began to emerge.  
Political disputes enhanced by or rooted in historical differences in religious, political, 
and economic traditions during several centuries of cultural development proved more 
potent than the many commonalities of the Yugoslav peoples and the political forces that 
had originally brought them together, and eventually led to the dismantling of Yugoslavia 
in the 1990s.   
The future of the former Yugoslav space and the individual successor states 
depends partly on how social and cultural differences are treated.  Language has become 
one of the key differences within Bosnia and between Serbia and Croatia.  While the 
shared standard was once Serbo-Croatian, which is still almost universally understood 
and widely spoken throughout the former Yugoslavia, each successor state and ethnicity 
now appears intent on asserting the uniqueness of its own language.  This thesis attempts 
to answer the following research questions:  What are the internal trends and dynamics of 
language usage in each of these three countries?  What is the relationship between official 
policies and actual language use?  
B. IMPORTANCE 
When fighting started in Yugoslavia in 1991, European Community (EC) leaders 
expressed confidence that the EC could handle the situation.  In the event, however, 
neither the EC nor the United Nations (UN) was able to stop the combat among the 
warring parties.  NATO forces brought an end to fighting in Bosnia and Kosovo, and they 
have remained to provide security and stability for the implementation of peace 
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agreements.  The European Union assumed primary responsibility for the mission in 
Bosnia in December 2004.  Slovenia has joined the European Union (EU) and Slovenia 
and Croatia have joined NATO, but most of the Yugoslav successor states—and Bosnia 
and Kosovo in particular—present a continuing challenge to the EU and NATO.  
Moreover, Balkan instability tests the EU’s resolve and its capability to maintain order 
near its borders.   
The matter of language usage as a potential point of contention within and among 
the former Yugoslav republics may appear trivial alongside other causes of division.  
However, official language policies can provide a helpful gauge of a government’s 
political intentions, and actual language usage—“authentic speech,” as experts in 
linguistics term it—may help reveal the inclinations of the public.  Both can offer insight 
into the root causes and current trends of conflict and disunity in the countries of the 
former Yugoslavia and may throw light on possible solutions for resolving conflict. 
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESIS 
Slovenia, the first republic of Yugoslavia to declare independence, uses a 
language similar to but distinct from Serbo-Croatian.  The Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia (FYROM) likewise uses a related but separate language.  Both left the 
Yugoslav state with little commotion in comparison with the violence occasioned by the 
departures of Croatia and Bosnia, whose languages are largely identical to that spoken in 
Serbia.  Kosovo represents a unique case in that the United States and most EU member 
states regard it as a former province of Serbia, but the fact that the overwhelming 
majority of the population speaks Albanian certainly played a role in the strivings for 
independence. 
While language differences played some role in Yugoslavia’s demise, the future 
of the Yugoslav successor states now depends on cooperation among them and their 
neighbors, as well as their capacity to establish domestic harmony and cohesion.  This 




for a time by Slovenia due to a border dispute.  Similarly, FYROM’s admission to NATO 
has been barred by Greece, which lays claim to the word “Macedonia” as a place name 
and contests its use by another state. 
On the surface, the differences among the languages of Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia 
are quite minor.  The alphabet for each language contains the same characters, but they 
are written differently.  Serbia and Republika Srpska in Bosnia primarily use a Cyrillic 
alphabet, often referred to as the Eastern variant, while Croatia and the Federation of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bosnia) use a Latin-based alphabet referred to as Latin or the 
Western variant.1   
Beyond how the languages are written, there are some dialectal distinctions that 
incorporate different vocabulary and spellings.  The differences are sufficiently minor to 
make the languages mutually intelligible in speech and writing, but great enough to allow 
one to classify speech or writing based on word choice, pronunciation, or spelling and 
other elements of orthography. 
Using a different script and a few different words to communicate the same 
meaning should not generally have a significant effect on relationships between two 
countries—or two ethnic groups within the same country.  When associated with 
memories of atrocities during war, however, any difference can become a wedge.  The 
impetus for Croatia and the other successor states of the former Yugoslavia to seek 
independence may be attributed to the revival of much earlier exhibitions of nationalism.  
Uniting in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes offered the constituent parts 
protection from continued subservience to the great powers that would have otherwise 
probably divided the Balkans at the end of World War I.2   
This union of Southern Slavs was compelled by circumstances and not regarded 
as preferable to the independence of each ethnic group.  The Croats and the Slovenes 
subsequently never lost their desire for independence.  The turbulent birth of the 
                                                 
1 Republika Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina are the two political entities 
that constitute the country recognized as Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
2 Stevan K. Pavlowitch, Serbia: The History of an Idea (New York: New York University Press, 
2002), 108–111. 
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Kingdom of Yugoslavia, as it came to be known, was perhaps a portent of its troubled 
future.  Externally, the Kingdom, whose territory was not well defined at its inception, 
engaged in border disputes all around, including a struggle with Italy for control of 
coastal regions.  Internally, ethnic strife developed as the Croats and the Slovenes 
complained about what they perceived as the overbearing manner of the Serbs.3  A 
pattern developed in which each ethnic group sought to maintain and at times emphasize 
its individuality in lieu of surrendering its identity to the concept of pan-Yugoslavism. 
Language represents one of the many ways in which nationalism has been 
expressed in the Yugoslav successor states.  Since 1991, efforts to preserve and even 
cultivate the unique characteristics of the Croatian language have increased.  Moreover, 
in Bosnia, a new language, though perhaps only in name, has emerged—Bosnian.  This 
phenomenon raises several questions.  How much of the manipulation of language in 
these countries is the product of the political agendas of governing or aspiring elites?  
How much is the result of the peoples of Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia wishing to express 
their individuality?  How do changes in their languages affect relations among the 
countries and among the residents of each country?  This study hypothesizes that each 
government has politicized language to some degree, but that only the more extreme 
elements of each government have suggested policies that, if implemented, would result 
in significant changes to language usage.   
D. METHODS AND SOURCES 
In addition to the scholarly works cited, this thesis also draws on relevant official 
documents and statements of the governments of Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia.  Other 
sources include studies conducted on the spoken and written languages in each country.  
Reports in the media also provide revealing information regarding changes in language 
use and language policy and the public reaction to those changes. 
The language environments in Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia are analyzed as case 
studies.  Each country is first treated as a separate case, to the extent possible given the 
                                                 
3 Misha Glenny, The Balkans (New York: Penguin Group, 1999), 365–366.  
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historic connections among the languages in the subject countries.  The effects of the 
language environment on the international relations of Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia are 
also treated as individual cases. 
E. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis identifies the current official language policies of Bosnia, Croatia and 
Serbia as determined by their respective constitutions, relevant laws, and government 
positions and statements pertaining to language use.  An analytical description of the 
patterns of actual language use in each country follows.  This enables the thesis to 
compare official intent with the behavior of the public, and to assess the effects of 
language policy and other factors on common usage.  A final analysis of the factors 
presented yields conclusions regarding the influence of official language policies and the 
role of politics on language use and in Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia. 
This thesis is organized as follows:  Chapter II describes the official language 
policies of the governments of Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia.  Chapter III examines actual 
language usage in each state and the politicization of language.  Chapter IV presents an 
analysis and conclusions.   
 6
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II. LANGUAGE POLICIES OF CROATIA, SERBIA,  
AND BOSNIA 
Independence for each of the successor states of the former Yugoslavia brought 
with it the opportunity for a fresh start.  Each new state drafted a constitution, established 
a government, wrote laws and set policies.  As the new states endeavored to improve 
their circumstances, opportunities arose for them to join international organizations and 
enter treaty arrangements that arose from NATO and European Union efforts to increase 
stability and address human rights issues.  Among the many policies each government 
proceeded to address, the matter of language use was not particularly prominent in itself, 
yet the treatment of language plays an important role in each new state.   
A state’s language policy does not simply identify a language for official use.  
Language policy also serves as a means to remedy social concerns, or at times to assert a 
political agenda.4  The policy decisions pertaining to language use in each successor state 
of the former Yugoslavia derive from the unique history of the development of language 
in the region.  The efforts to distinguish the language of each state did not arise from the 
antagonisms that tore Yugoslavia apart in 1991, but instead represent a continuation of 
the evolution of language that began with the origins of the languages in use in each 
Yugoslav successor state today.  A brief recounting of that history sets the context of the 
current language policies.   
A. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF SERBIAN AND CROATIAN 
Slavs first moved south onto the Balkan Peninsula in the sixth century A.D., 
descending from the north first as raiders, and eventually settling across the region.5  The 
Byzantine Empire brought Christianity to the region by the ninth century; and because 
the Church used Latin, the literate elements of society likewise spoke and wrote in Latin.  
                                                 
4 Thomas Ricento, “Language Policy: Theory and Practice–An Introduction,” in An Introduction 
to Language Policy: Theory and Method, ed. Thomas Ricento (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2006), 11. 
5 Tim Judah, The Serbs: History, Myth and the Destruction of Yugoslavia (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1997), 7. 
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The origins of written Slavic languages in the Byzantine Empire are attributed to the 
missionary brothers Constantine and Methodius (now better known as Saints Cyril and 
Methodius) and Saint Methodius who devised an alphabet in order to facilitate their 
proselytizing efforts among Slavic speakers.  Commissioned by Byzantine emperor 
Michael III in the ninth century A.D., the brothers devised the letters of the Glagolitic 
alphabet using combinations of symbols important in Christianity for the primary purpose 
of translating religious texts into the Slavic languages.6  This alphabet, which came to be 
known as the Glagolitic alphabet (the name is derived from glagol, Old Slavic for speak), 
formed the literary basis for Old Church Slavonic, or Old Slavic, and gained widespread 
acceptance in the Balkans.7   
This new alphabet encountered resistance from church officials in Rome, which 
condemned any attempts to write scripture in any language other than Aramaic, Greek, 
Hebrew or Latin.  Accused of heresy in Venice, Saints Cyril and Methodius traveled to 
Rome to convince the Church of their righteous intentions.  Saint Cyril died in Rome, and 
Saint Methodius returned to the Balkans unsuccessful in his attempt to gain church 
approval of the new alphabet.  However, the followers of Cyril and Methodius continued 
the campaign to spread the use of written Slavic with the alphabet that Cyril and 
Methodius had devised.  In Bulgaria, the followers found a ready supporter of written 
texts in King Boris.  However, the Bulgarians found the Glagolitic alphabet too 
cumbersome.  More acquainted with the Greek alphabet, the followers of Cyril and 
Methodius adapted the Greek alphabet to the spoken Slavic languages, giving rise to the 
Cyrillic alphabet, named in honor of Saint Cyril.8  Despite continued resistance from the 
Church in Rome, the Cyrillic alphabet gained prominence in Bulgaria.9  After the deaths  
 
 
                                                 
6 Ronelle Alexander, Bosnian, Croatian, Serbian: A Grammar with Sociolinguistic Commentary 
(Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 2006), 380. 
7 Milan Moguš, A History of the Croatian Language: Toward a Common Standard (Zagreb, 
Croatia: Globus, 1995), 14. 
8 Alexander, Bosnian, Croatian, Serbian, 380–381. 
9 Stanley G. Evans, A Short History of Bulgaria (London: Lawrence and Wishart Ltd., 1960), 43. 
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of Cyril and Methodius, their followers propagated the Slavic language written with the 
Cyrillic alphabet, which by the twelfth century had largely displaced the Glagolitic 
alphabet throughout the Balkans.10   
In Croatia, however, the Glagolitic script had become widely accepted and more 
entrenched in Croatian texts.  Despite the quick advance of the Cyrillic alphabet 
throughout the region, including in Croatia, the Glagolitic script endured in Croatia into 
the Renaissance period.11  However, Croatia’s position between east and west created 
friction between the influences of the East and the West.  Croatia’s religious ties to Rome 
and political ties to Vienna proved stronger and slowly eroded Eastern influences, 
resulting in the prevalence of Latin in official and liturgical use.   
The mixing of Eastern and Western influences resulted in changes to the written 
language in Croatia.  By the fourteenth century Croatians had fully adapted the Latin 
alphabet to the Slavic language.12  The Serbian Orthodox Church made exclusive use of 
the Cyrillic script.  Moreover, differences in vocabulary arose based on distinct cultural 
influences introduced through political and religious connections.13  This early and 
significant differentiation between language use in Croatia and Serbia was perhaps 
fateful, as it set apart the language used in Croatia as exceptional in comparison with 
other south Slavic languages.   
The development of language in the western and central Balkans was heavily 
shaped by the politics of the nineteenth century.  During that time, the Habsburg and 
Ottoman Empires exercised control over the Balkans.  The Habsburg Empire maintained 
control over Croatia, Slovenia and much of Serbia, while the Ottoman Empire 
predominated in Bosnia, Macedonia and the southern part of Serbia.  Each empire 
influenced the culture and, subsequently, the language of its Balkan vassals. 
                                                 
10 Moguš, A History of the Croatian Language, 27. 
11 Roland Sussex and Paul Cubberley, The Slavic Languages (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2006), 74. 
12 Moguš, A History of the Croatian Language, 29. 
13 Norman Berdichevsky, Nations, Language and Citizenship (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2004), 
165. 
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Habsburg policies and practices aimed at increasing unity applied to regular 
society as well.  To create a state of a united people required, it was presumed, the 
creation and perpetuation of a Magyar nationality.  This goal gave rise to the policies of 
Magyarization, which consisted of the introduction of Magyar culture, including the 
Hungarian language, into other cultures and nationalities.14  Students in the Northeast 
Balkans forced to learn Hungarian did so at the expense of learning their own language 
well and, thus, learned neither sufficiently well.15  Likewise, in the Northwest Balkans 
the Dual Monarchy mandated education in German.16 
The Ottoman Empire similarly imposed its own standards and influences, most 
notably on Kosovo and Bosnia.  Ottoman policies favored converts to Islam, which 
predictably resulted in numerous households embracing the religion of their masters.  
Ottoman rule also introduced the Turkish language, resulting in the adoption of numerous 
Turkish terms that persist today, especially in Bosnia.17 
                                                 
14 Oscar Jaszi, The Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1929), 145. 
15 Ibid., 330. 
16 Robert A. Kahn, A History of the Habsburg Empire (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1974), 439. 
17 John D. Prince, “Surviving Turkish Elements in Serbo-Croatian,” in Journal of the American 
Oriental Society 51:3 (September 1931): 241. 
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Figure 1.   Balkans, 1908 through the Second Balkan War of 191318 
The first political union of southern Slavs occurred at the end of the First World 
War in hopes of ending centuries of foreign domination.  The southern Slavs did not trust 
the great powers that were soon to decide the fate of much of Europe.  The Kingdom of 
Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes offered the constituent parts protection from continued 
subservience to the great powers that would likely have otherwise divided the Balkans up 
at the end of World War I.  However, the formation of this union of southern Slavs was 
compelled by circumstances, even though some groups, the Croats in particular, favored 
                                                 
18 Central Intelligence Agency, The Former Yugoslavia: A Map Folio, 1992, Perry Castaneda 
Library Map Collection, University of Texas. Available online at http://lib.utexas.edu/maps (accessed 
March 8, 2010). 
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independence.19  Montenegro, which had resisted Ottoman incursions and maintained its 
sovereignty, was reduced overnight to a republic in a new state.  Croatian politician 
August Košutić, speaking at the Chatham House in London fifteen years later, contended 
that not all southern Slavs agreed with the act that created the Kingdom.  Croats in 
particular were not inclined to forego an opportunity for independence by accepting 
union with Serbia and the other south Slavic entities.  Košutić’s Croat Peasant Party 
protested to U.S. President Woodrow Wilson when he met with other world leaders in 
Paris that the act creating the Kingdom was unwelcome and not representative of the will 
of all affected.20  Throughout Yugoslavia’s history, Croatia consistently asserted its 
independent nature, including through distinctions in language.   
The turbulent birth of the Kingdom was perhaps a portent of its troubled future.  
Externally, the Kingdom engaged in border disputes with neighboring states, as the 
Yugoslav territory was not well defined at its somewhat hasty inception.  Internally, 
ethnic strife developed as the Serbs exerted their influence in a manner that the other 
ethnicities regarded as overbearing.21  Both of these factors directly affected the 
population of Vojvodina, the northern province of Serbia bordering Hungary and home to 
a sizeable number of ethnic Hungarians that in 1918 suddenly became subjects of 
Belgrade.   
Commonly known as the Kingdom of Yugoslavia from the beginning, it was 
officially named so in 1929 to discourage the resurgence of nationalism among the 
numerous ethnic groups within its borders.  Despite efforts to deemphasize differences, a 




                                                 
19 Ivo Banac, The National Question in Yugoslavia: Origins, History, Politics (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 1984), 116–119.  See also Stevan K. Pavlowitch, Serbia: The History of an Idea 
(New York: New York University Press, 2002), 108–111. 
20 August Kossutitch, “The Croatian Problem,” in International Affairs 12:1 (January 1933): 82–3. 
21 Misha Glenny, The Balkans (New York: Penguin Group, 1999), 365–366. 
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individuality in lieu of surrendering its unique identity to the concept of pan-Yugoslavism.  
Language represented one aspect of differentiation.  Croatia, whose language most resembled 
that of Serbia, made special efforts to affirm the uniqueness of its language.   
B. BIRTH OF THE SERBO-CROATIAN / CROATO-SERBIAN LANGUAGE 
In 1850, a small number of Croat and Serb linguists met in Vienna to discuss a 
joint language.  The result was the 1850 Literary Agreement, a manifestation of efforts to 
encourage south Slavic unity through the standardization of the Croatian and Serbian 
languages.  The Literary Agreement did not follow logically in the course of cultural 
evolution, however, as each language had until  then consistently grown more different 
from the other.22  But movements to standardize communications within Croatia and 
Serbia faced challenges within their own language communities as well. The written form 
of Serbian prior to the Literary Agreement bore little resemblance to the language spoken 
by the common people and was not used outside literary circles.  Meanwhile, four 
primary dialects of the Croatian language had attained literary status in their own right 
within the regions where each dialect dominated.23   
The primary figures in language reform in the middle 1800s, Ljudevit Gaj in 
Croatia and Vuk Stefanović Karadžić in Serbia, hoped to use language as a means to 
unite southern Slavs politically.  These men filled prominent roles in reforming the 
Croatian and Serbian languages during a time of rising nationalism and revolts against 
the Ottomans.  For Gaj, language reform fit into the larger picture of the renewed Illyrian 
movement in Croatia, of which Gaj was a proponent, and also agreed with the concept of 
Pan-Slavism to which he subscribed.  In Serbia, Karadžić also labored diligently to 
record and promulgate the Serbian language as spoken by the common people.  Karadžić 
published collections of folk songs and a Serbian dictionary.  He also revised the 
 
 
                                                 
22 Robert D. Greenburg, Language and Identity in the Balkans: Serbo-Croatian and its 
Disintegration (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 24. 
23 Greenburg, Language and Identity in the Balkans, 25. 
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Serbian alphabet, removing disused and redundant graphemes.  In formulating the 
reforms he proposed, Karadžić subscribed to the maxim proposed by German linguist 
Johan Adelung to “write as you speak.”24   
The Croatian Illyrian movement, drawing its name from a historical identification 
of the Balkan peninsula, particularly relied on a literary tradition that perpetuated the 
Croatian language and thus a Croatian nation through extensive periods of foreign 
domination.25  The short-lived Croatian kingdom of the tenth century united Croats along 
the Dalmatian coast and in the Roman province of Pannonia under the Croat King 
Tomislav.26  However, Croatia had little chance to solidify its position and form lasting 
national institutions before foreign powers divided and dominated Croatia.  Both 
Magyars to the east and Venetians to the west exercised control over the lands where the 
Croats lived.  While the Catholic religion provided some cohesion, it was not a 
distinctively Croatian institution and, therefore, did not provide a base upon which to 
build a Croatian nation.27   
In contrast, Serbia maintained greater political autonomy through periods of 
foreign domination.  Furthermore, the Serbian Orthodox Church, established in Kosovo 
in the fourteenth century A.D., served as a consistent symbol of the Serbian nation.28  For 
Croatia, a common language represented the only institution that could serve to unify the 
Croatian people.29  Collaborating with Serbia in language reform through the Literary 
Agreement, while distasteful to Croatian purists, represented a compromise that 
corresponded with the concept of pan-Slavism while simultaneously helping to 
standardize the Croatian language and thereby unify the Croatian people.   
                                                 
24 Duncan Wilson, The Life and Times of Vuk Stefanović Karadžić (Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press, 1986), 104. 
25 Moguš, A History of the Croatian Language, 158. 
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The 1850 Literary Agreement made little change to either the Serbian or Croatian 
languages because it dealt primarily with recognizing the status of the languages and dialects 
along with minor phonological inconsistencies between the languages.  It therefore contributed 
little toward reconciling the Croatian and Serbian languages.  The Agreement was most 
significant in that it derived from the willingness and desire on the part of at least some 
language reformers to compromise in order to bring the languages into closer agreement, and 
largely in opposition to the Habsburg policies of Magyarization.30   
In the years following the 1850 Literary Agreement, sustained nationalism in Croatia 
prompted the creation of the Yugoslav Academy of Sciences and Arts in Zagreb in 1867.  The 
Yugoslav Academy contained the first institution concerned with south Slavic languages.  The 
leaders of the Academy promoted the idea of a union of southern Slavs that would include a 
shared language.31  At the Yugoslav Academy, Serbs and Croats worked together to publish 
language guides, including grammars and dictionaries, in hopes to define a single standard for 
both languages.  In 1886, newly independent Serbia founded the Royal Academy of Sciences 
and Arts that then introduced its own works to standardize the Serbian language alone, 
effectively splitting away from the Yugoslav Academy.32   
Serbian and Croatian were spoken in three dialects during the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries.  Each is identified by its term for the pronoun what—što in the Štokavian 
dialect, kaj in Kajkavian, and ča in Čakavian. Štokavian has always been the most widely 
spoken dialect, displaced as the predominant dialect only in parts of Croatia.  Kajkavian is 
spoken in northern Croatia, especially in the Zagreb area, and Čakavian is spoken along the 
Adriatic coast in Dalmatia and on the Istrian peninsula.33  Another literary division arose from 
different renderings of the old Slavic grapheme, or letter, jat.  In Serbia and eastern Bosnia, the 
jat became e, and in Croatia and western Bosnia it was rendered ije.  The result was an Eastern 
variant identified as ekavian and a Western ijekavian variant.   
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Substantial efforts to unite the Serbian and Croatian languages came with the 
creation of Yugoslavia despite continued opposition by groups that promoted the purity 
of their own language.  While Vuk Karadžić and his followers promoted the Štokavian 
dialect using the Cyrillic alphabet, Croat nationalists were reluctant to abandon their 
regional dialects.  In 1914, Jovan Skerlić, a prominent Serb linguist, proposed a 
compromise in which the Latin script and the ekavian variant would become the standard.  
The Serbs would have under this arrangement given up the Cyrillic script and the Croats 
would have accepted the Eastern variant.34  This proposal never gained traction, but it set 
the stage for future negotiations on the matter.   
In December 1954, Serb and Croat linguists representing the primary literary 
societies of each republic met in Novi Sad with the support of Tito’s government to 
resolve inconsistencies between Serbian and Croatian and to determine a name for the 
joint language.35  At the end they agreed to ten conclusions that set a course of greater 
collaboration and standardization between the dialects and variants.  The name of the 
joint language, they determined, must include the names of both of its main communities 
of speakers—hence, it would be referred to as Serbo-Croatian or Croato-Serbian.  Known 
as the Novi Sad Agreement, this opened a new era in linguistic cooperation.36   
The cooperation exhibited in the Novi Sad Agreement and subsequent publication 
of joint grammars and dictionaries never eliminated opposition to a joint language.  Some 
cultural and literature institutes and societies in Croatia and Serbia always asserted the 
independence of each language.  This opposition, along with popular use of language, 
ensured that the joint language never displaced the regional dialects or variants.  When 
Yugoslavia dissolved, the time was ripe to renew commitments to national languages and 
to emphasize their differentiation.   
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C. LANGUAGE POLICY IN CROATIA 
When Croatia gained independence from Yugoslavia, nationalist sentiments 
fueled a prompt return to all things Croatian.  With independence came an equally 
independent Croatian language.  Croatia’s constitution clearly defines the official stance 
on language.  Article 12 of the constitution reads,  
The Croatian language and the Latin script shall be in official use in the 
Republic of Croatia.  In individual local units, another language and the 
Cyrillic or some other script may be introduced into official use along with 
the Croatian language and the Latin script under conditions specified by 
law.37   
This policy clearly accommodates minority languages and especially those Serbs that 
remain in Croatia that may prefer the Cyrillic script that is the standard in Serbia.  
However, the caveat that other scripts may be used “along with” the Croatian language 
and the Latin script emphasizes their primacy.   
The insistence on using a particular language and alphabet seems quite natural.  
After all, most states have an official language. Only those who reside in Croatia and 
do not speak Croatian might struggle to communicate.  Croatia’s 2001 census reports 
indicate that approximately 4 percent of the population speaks one of twenty-three 
mother tongues other than Croatian.38  Though a few of the languages identified 
perhaps did not warrant a separate category, such as Croatian-Serbian39 and Serbo-
Croatian, the plethora of languages provides some insight into diversity in Croatia.  
The majority of other mother tongues identified, such as Hungarian, Italian, 
Romanian and Slovenian, are native to neighboring states.  It is reasonable to expect 
that significant populations of other nationalities from neighboring states would 
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reside in Croatia.  More revealing is the fact that the vast majority of the population, 
approximately 96 percent, reported their mother tongue as Croatian.40   
Several laws address the treatment of Croatia’s multiple minority languages.  In 
2000, the Croatian Parliament passed two laws—the Law on the Equal Official Use of 
Language and Script of National Minorities in the Republic of Croatia, and the Law on 
Education in Minority Languages.  In December 2002, Croatia passed another law on the 
rights of minorities that replaced the Constitutional Law on Human Rights and the Rights 
of Ethnic and National Communities or Minorities in the Republic of Croatia.  Each of 
these laws updated Yugoslav-era policies and brought Croatia into greater compliance 
with European Union standards regarding the treatment of minority languages.41   
The newest legislation on minority rights confirms the government’s stance on 
language.  The law forthrightly protects the use of minority languages in public and 
official use, and in education.  However, the law also states that “the right and obligation 
of pupils educated in the language and script of national minorities shall be to learn the 
Croatian language and Latin script according to the determined curriculum, apart from 
their own language and script.”42  Furthermore, all official business and documents 
completed in a minority language must also be accomplished in Croatian and in Latin 
script.  Requiring the majority language for education and official business makes perfect 
sense.  What stands out is the consistent requirement of the use of the Latin script.  While 
this also makes sense, as it is the script in most common use, it appears to serve also as a 
statement against the Cyrillic script promoted in Serbia and Republika Srpska in Bosnia.   
The manner in which other languages are received in Croatia is addressed by 
international agreements to which Croatia is a party.  Besides its Constitution and other 
laws, Croatia has agreed to certain European treaties that prescribe liberal policies on 
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language use.  Croatia acceded to the Council of Europe’s Framework Convention for the 
Protection of National Minorities (FCNM) in November 1997.  The FCNM sets standards 
for access to information and services for national minorities and monitors signatory 
states for compliance.  Standards include the freedom of the members of any nationality 
or ethnic group to use their national language as they see fit, and for the state to facilitate 
their language preference by making information available in that language, including 
government publications, ballots, and road signs in areas with a sizeable population that 
uses a minority language.43   
Croatia also ratified the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, 
which is intended to preserve and encourage the use of minority languages in the media 
and in education.  A Croat, Vesna Crnić-Grotić, currently serves as the first vice-chair of 
the Committee of Experts of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages 
(hereafter termed the Charter).  In its 2001 evaluation of Croatia’s implementation of the 
Charter, the Charter’s Committee of Experts noted a number of ways in which Croatia 
could improve its support of minority languages, and stated that “the reorganisation of 
territorial administration, since 1992, seems to have created an obstacle to the promotion 
of regional or minority languages.”44  Subsequent reports on Croatia indicate that in 
general it has cooperated with the Committee but has implemented changes in reaction to 
requests rather than proactively identifying areas that need improvement and taking the 
necessary action.  Based on the assessments of the Charter’s Committee of Experts and 
the tone of the legislation in Croatia, it appears that Zagreb’s efforts to support minority 
languages are probably attributable to pressures from the European Union; but there is no 
design to impose the use of Croatian over any other tongue.   
A 2005 evaluation of the implementation of the Charter further noted that the 
number of people in Croatia whose first language was not Croatian declined significantly 
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in the 2001 census from the numbers reported in the 1991 census.45  The number of 
people that claimed Serbian as their language registered the largest decline, 78.4 percent, 
no doubt due in large part to the exodus of ethnic Serbs from Slavonia and the Vojna 
Krajina (Military Frontier) after Croatia’s Operation Oluja (Storm) in 1995.46  The 
evaluation did not venture any hypotheses to explain the decrease in the population of 
those claiming other mother tongues.   
D. LANGUAGE POLICY IN SERBIA 
Serbia remained united with Montenegro in what remained of the Yugoslav 
federation after each of the other former republics declared independence.  In 2003, 
Yugoslavia ceased to exist and was replaced by the Union of Serbia and Montenegro.  A 
2006 referendum in Montenegro decided for independence, thus terminating the last 
vestiges of Tito’s federation of south Slavs.   
Serbia adopted a new constitution, the first for an independent Serbia, in 
November 2006.  Several provisions of the constitution address language use.  Article 10 
of the Constitution of the Republic of Serbia sets basic language policy in two simple 
sentences—“Serbian language and Cyrillic script shall be in official use in the Republic 
of Serbia,” and “Official use of other languages and scripts shall be regulated by the law 
based on the Constitution.”  The constitution also protects the use of languages besides 
Serbian.  Article 21 prohibits discrimination based on language, and Article 199 provides 
for the use of one’s own language in court proceedings or other interactions with the 
state.47  Several other sections of the constitution likewise protect and promote the use of 
other languages in Serbia.  Among the other references to language, Article 79 most 
thoroughly discusses the use of other languages under the title “Right to preservation of 
specificity:”   
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Members of national minorities shall have a right to:   
expression, preservation, fostering, developing and public expression of 
national, ethnic, cultural, [and] religious specificity;  
use of their symbols in public places; use of their language and script; 
have proceedings also conducted in their languages before state bodies, 
organisations with delegated public powers, bodies of autonomous 
provinces and local self-government units, in areas where they make a 
significant majority of population;  
education in their languages in public institutions and institutions of 
autonomous provinces;  
founding private educational institutions;  
use of their name and family name in their language; traditional local 
names, names of streets, settlements and topographic names also written in 
their languages, in areas where they make a significant majority of [the] 
population;  
complete, timely and objective information in their language, including 
the right to expression, receiving, sending and exchange of information 
and ideas;  
establishing their own mass media, in accordance with the Law.48 
As one might suspect considering the lengthy treatment of language in the 
constitution, the matter of using other languages and scripts arises daily in Serbia.  The last 
census, conducted in 2002, reported that there were twelve ethnicities residing in Serbia—
Serb, Montenegrin, Yugoslav, Albanian, Bosniak, Bulgarian, Bunjevac, Valachian, 
Gornac, Hungarian, Macedonian, and Moslem.49  Many of the larger populations of 
minority ethnicities, particularly Hungarian and Albanian, are concentrated in specific 
geographical areas.  The majority of the residents of Kosovo, which declared independence 
from Serbia in 2008, are ethnic Albanian.  The Sandžak region along the border between 
Serbia and Montenegro hosts a large Bosniak population.  The northern province of 
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Vojvodina is home to many Hungarians, Croats and other ethnic minorities.  Vojvodina’s 
status in relation to Serbia has changed several times throughout their association, and it 
presently operates with substantial autonomy.   
Serbia is a party to international laws and agreements that stipulate specific rights 
for minority populations.  The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, of which Serbia is the 
legal successor, assented to the FCNM treaty in November 2001.50    Serbia also inherited 
signatory status with the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages.  A 2007 
Charter report indicated that Serbia has been faithful in efforts to accommodate speakers 
of minority languages.  For example, the Ministry of Education and Sport permits Roma 
assistants to help Roma students attending Serbian schools.  Also, the Organization for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) has helped Serbia modernize its police 
force.  As part of that effort, the Ministry of Internal Affairs publishes advertisements for 
police employment and offers police training courses in minority languages.51   
At least one minority rights advocacy group has expressed concern about the 
extent of official support for the use of national languages.  The Fund for an Open 
Society in Serbia published research on the availability of news media in national 
languages.  Analysis of the laws regulating information dissemination in minority 
languages revealed inadequate provisions due to frequent revision of existing laws 
and, during the period when Slobodan Milošević served as president, political 
interference and legal machinations that restricted the flow of information.52  This 
report also points out the potential for the privatization of state media to threaten 
news media production in minority languages.  Privatization of state-run media 
outlets is viewed as beneficial for unbiased and independent news coverage; however, 
state-run media also subsidize production and distribution in minority languages.  
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Because small-scale publication in low density languages produces little economic 
benefit, private outlets will be less likely to serve those communities.53   
Since the publication of the research by the Fund for an Open Society, Serbia has 
initiated structural changes to address minority rights.  Most notably, Serbia created a 
National Minority Council to coordinate issues pertaining to national minorities and to 
propose relevant legislation.  The Ministers for Culture, Education, Human and Minority 
Rights, Interior, Justice, Public Administration, Religion, and Youth and Sports sit on the 
National Minority Council.  The National Minority Council held its first meeting in 
October 2009 to establish operating procedures.54  A primary aim of the National 
Minority Council is to facilitate implementation of the Law on National Minorities 
Councils, which was drafted days before the Council’s first meeting.  This law calls for 
the formation of councils for national minorities in Serbia as a first step toward granting a 
degree of self-government to minority groups.  Presently, minority councils only operate 
within their locality.  Serbia will register minorities for elections of minority councils to 
be held in May and June 2010.55  Once elected, the presidents of the new minority 
councils will represent their nationality in the National Minority Council.   
Serbia clearly advocates the use of the Eastern variant of Serbian accompanied by 
the Cyrillic script.  However, based on its constitution, laws and official actions, Serbia 
does not by any official means impinge on the use of other languages, including the use 
of the Western variant or the Latin script.  This tolerance or even promotion of minority 
national languages in Serbia corresponds to Serbia’s efforts to join the European Union.  
Furthermore, the apparently neutral legal stance on variations in the use of Serbian, to be 
addressed in the next chapter, indicates only that no agreed upon standards for the 
Serbian language exist.   
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E. LANGUAGE POLICY IN BOSNIA 
Bosnia presents a unique case among its peers in that its government was 
designed under the close supervision of interested international parties and drafted as part 
of the 1995 peace negotiations in Dayton.  The peace agreement created an internal 
partition of Bosnia, organizing the state into two entities—the (Bosniak and Croat) 
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH) and the Republika Srpska.  The people of 
Bosnia likewise remain distinctly divided between three factions—Croats, Serbs, and 
Bosniaks. 
Bosnia’s internal divisions stem from its location near several large civilizations 
through most of its history.  Parts of Bosnia fell at different times under the control of 
Romans, Bulgarians, Hungarians, Croats, Serbs, and Ottomans.56  One result of the 
numerous conquests was the introduction of different religions.  The Catholic Church 
dominated in the north and west of the region that today is Bosnia, while in Herzegovina, 
the Orthodox Church dominated from Constantinople and later from Serbia.  These 
territories remained largely separated until a strong Bosnian leader united them, along 
with much of the Dalmatian coast, in the early 1300s.  The Ottoman conquests in the late 
1300s brought Muslim rule initially to Kosovo and Herzegovina and within the next two 
hundred years to much of Bosnia and Serbia.57  Bosnia therefore became a middle ground 
between East and West, and between Christianity and Islam.   
Although Bosnia served as a mixing bowl for west Balkan nationalities, each 
resident group maintained its own identity.  The enduring nature of national divisions in 
Bosnia was manifest in the first political parties that Austria-Hungary allowed to 
organize.  Parties formed along the lines of religion and ethnicity—Catholic Croats, 
Orthodox Serbs and Muslims (Bosniaks).  The identities that naturally formed through 
political processes were over time reinforced and further institutionalized.58   
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As nationalism grew in the territories under Habsburg rule, the monarchy 
recognized a need to dampen this trend and, therefore, attempted to inculcate a sense of 
unity among its subjects.  To achieve this sense of unity would require a common identity 
and purpose.  The military served as one vehicle to achieve this end.  Soldiers in the joint 
Habsburg army were assigned to posts away from home and frequently transferred to 
other areas.  The monarchy hoped that exposing soldiers to essentially foreign places and 
cultures would foster solidarity and overcome any tendency toward greater loyalty to 
their own nationality.59   
Although this policy did not fulfill its intended purpose, it did succeed in mixing 
the population somewhat and promoting different settlement patterns.  One potent 
manifestation of this policy was the formation of the Military Frontier, or Vojna Krajina.  
The Military Frontier stretched from northern Serbia across Croatian Slavonia and 
northern Bosnia to the Adriatic coast.  The Habsburgs designed the Military Frontier as a 
barricade against advances by the Ottomans.  Serb families received exemption from 
taxes in exchange for settling the Military Frontier and pledging military support to the 
Habsburg monarchy.60  Serbs remained a significant proportion of the population of the 
Krajina in Croatia until many Serbs fled before the Croat military advance in Operation 
Oluja in 1995.  The Serb population of Bosnia now concentrated in Republika Srpska 
also derives largely from the Military Frontier.   
Austria-Hungary’s efforts to check Slavic nationalism extended to language 
policy as well.  The Serbs showed the greatest propensity for opposing foreign rule, and 
thus were most targeted by policies designed to undermine their solidarity.  Austria-
Hungary therefore supported the creation of a Bosnian language in 1890, though no 
uniquely Bosnian language ultimately emerged at that time.61  Ironically, Austria-
Hungary reversed this policy in 1904 and forbade the identification of a separate Bosnian 
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language, reasoning that it would be easier to exercise authority over its Balkan holdings 
if there was but one language—Serbo-Croatian.62   
Efforts to discourage strong associations with an ethnic identity continued after 
the formation of Yugoslavia.  The first official title of the new state, the Kingdom of 
Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, appears in retrospect to have placed too much emphasis on a 
select few of the constituent ethnicities, a concession to those groups that had expressed 
strong reservations about abandoning hopes for sovereignty.  The state was commonly 
known from the beginning as the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and was officially renamed so 
in 1929 in part to discourage nationalism.63   
Nationalism as a divisive force remained a concern for Yugoslavia’s communist 
regime.  Tito encouraged the residents of communist Yugoslavia to view themselves as 
Yugoslavs, not as members of any particular ethnic group.64  Despite efforts to “cleanse” 
Yugoslavia’s citizens of their ethnic identities, cultural differences persisted.  Croatia 
sustained its independent spirit, including the maintenance of a measure of linguistic 
distinction through the Yugoslav Academy of Sciences and Arts in Zagreb.   
As a meeting ground between Croatia and Serbia, Bosnia’s population became the 
most heterogeneous of the Yugoslav republics.  In 1991, Croats, Serbs and Muslims 
(Bosniaks) constituted 17.4 percent, 31.2 percent, and 43.5 percent, respectively.  The 
percentages from earlier censuses reveal a trend toward a steadily increasing percentage 
of Bosniaks relative to Croats and Serbs, along with a decrease in the total number of 
Serbs in Bosnia.65  Nevertheless, prior to the violence of the 1990s, Bosnia’s capital 
Sarajevo presented a cosmopolitan face to the world, an example of what Tito had hoped 
to achieve throughout Yugoslavia.  Sarajevo even hosted the 1984 Winter Olympics.   
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Figure 2.   Ethnic Majorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 199166 
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A decade after Tito’s death in 1980, the Yugoslav federation began to unravel.  
Slovenia and Croatia grew impatient with the pace of reform and lobbied Belgrade for 
economic liberalization, while the ethnic Albanian majority in Kosovo clamored for 
greater autonomy.  Slobodan Milošević, as chairman of the Serb-dominated League of 
Communists of Yugoslavia, capitalized on growing Serb nationalism and anti-Albanian 
sentiment in 1989 to rescind the autonomy of the provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina.  In 
the midst of consolidating its power, Belgrade was not amenable to granting greater 
autonomy to Yugoslavia’s constituent republics.  The political tension in Yugoslavia 
culminated with Slovenia and Croatia declaring independence in June 1991, with Bosnia 
following in October 1991.  Bosnian Serbs then declared independence from Bosnia and 
established the Republika Srpska.  The fighting that ensued between Serbs and Bosniaks 
and between Croats and Bosniaks dramatically altered the demographic landscape of 
Bosnia.  Negotiations held in Dayton in 1995 finally ended the violence, and also 
produced Bosnia’s constitution as an annex to the General Framework Agreement for 
Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina.   
Bosnia’s violent birth and contentious formation shaped all aspects of its 
government, including official policies on language.  The Constitution of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina makes liberal allowances for the use of one’s language of preference.  The 
first mention of language, in Article I of the constitution, prohibits the denial of 
citizenship in Bosnia, FBiH, or Republika Srpska based on language.  Article II further 
prohibits the denial of any of the rights and privileges enumerated in the constitution 
based on language.67  The only other reference to language is buried in Annex I to the 
constitution, which identifies the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages 
among the human rights agreements that apply in Bosnia.   
The bifurcated governance of Bosnia allows each entity to establish policies and 
practices separate from one another and from those of the federal government.  The  
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Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina recognizes Bosnian and Croatian, both using the 
Latin script, as the official languages.  The Federation also acknowledges that other 
languages may be used in official communications and in education.68  Constitutional 
pronouncements on language in Republika Srpska resemble those of its neighbors.  The 
official language in Republika Srpska is Serbian using the Cyrillic script and either the 
Eastern (ekavski) or Western (ijekavski) variant.69  The constitutions of both the 
Federation and of Republika Srpska protect the use of other languages and prohibit 
discrimination based on language.70   
While the Croat-dominated regions of Bosnia look to Croatia for guidance on 
language standards, the Republika Srpska likewise looks to Serbia.  Just as Croats strictly 
use the Latin-based alphabet, Serbs use Cyrillic.  But not all Serbs use Cyrillic.  The 
common use of language by Serbs living in parts of Republika Srpska that border with 
Croatia has come to resemble Croatian more than Serbian.  Bosnian Serbs tend to use 
words specific to Croatian in lieu of their Serbian equivalents, and prefer the Latin script 
over Cyrillic.  Because the constitution officially allows free choice of language, there is 
little the government of Republika Srpska can do to influence this trend.  However, that 
has not stopped this government from trying.  To halt the “Croatization” of the language 
of Bosnian Serbs and to protect Republika Srpska’s “national interests, culture, and 
tradition,” a law has been proposed that would require government representatives to pass 
a language test to ascertain their proficiency in employing the official Serbian language 
and the Cyrillic alphabet.71   
 
                                                 
68 Constitutional Parliament of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, “Constitution of the 
Federation of Bosnian and Herzegovina,” Article I, http://www.ads.gov.ba/ javniispit/index.html (accessed 
March 8, 2010). 
69 National Assembly of Republika Srpska, “Constitution of the Republika Srpska,” Article 7, 
http://www.ads.gov.ba/javniispit/index.html (accessed March 8, 2010). 
70 “Constitution of the Republika Srpska,” Articles 10 and 34, and “Constitution of the Federation 
of Bosnian and Herzegovina,” Article II. 
71 “Kroatizacija Srpskog Jezika,” Večernji List, March 3, 2009, 2. 
 30
These three former Yugoslav republics treat language in a mostly neutral fashion 
under the law.  Apart from the Republika Srpska’s interest in requiring a language 
proficiency test for state employment, language appears as a choice for each individual 
and community to make without government interference.  The degree to which that in 
fact occurs is the topic of the following chapter. 
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III. LANGUAGE USE IN CROATIA, SERBIA, AND BOSNIA 
The terms and tone of speech one uses at home often differ somewhat from that 
spoken at school or at one’s place of employment.  Similarly, certain terms or phrases 
often gain greater favor within a geographical region or amongst members of a particular 
industry or profession.  For example, business professionals and those in the medical 
field or the military develop unique terms and acronyms not commonly employed outside 
of a professional setting.  This poses no challenge to communication, however, but rather 
enhances communication as individuals tailor their language to suit their environment.  
Similarly, regional distinctions in language use within a country generally pose no 
challenges to communication.  For example, in the Midwest of the United States one 
might request “pop” to drink, while elsewhere someone else may refer to the same 
beverage as “soda” or simply “Coke.”  Given the disparities in common, everyday 
language, it is not surprising that officially acceptable language does not always equate 
with social acceptance.   
The dialectical differences between the languages spoken in Croatia and Serbia 
gained renewed political significance with the breakup of Yugoslavia.  The republics of 
Slovenia and Macedonia, each of which has a comparatively homogenous ethnic 
population and its own unique language, avoided the brunt of the physical and cultural 
assaults occasioned by Yugoslavia’s demise.  The populations and hence cultures of 
Croatia, Serbia, and especially Bosnia had intermingled long enough to ensure that 
attempts at separation would be painful.   
A. LANGUAGE USE IN CROATIA 
The everyday use of language in Croatia has been heavily influenced by politics 
and events.  When Croatia declared independence from Yugoslavia, Croat leaders sought 
independence specifically from Serbia.  Croats and others perceived Serbia as dominating 
the Yugoslav federation from the beginning of its existence.  Ethnic Serbs tended to 
dominate the military and police forces until after the Second World War when Tito 
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endeavored to encourage multiculturalism by appointing leaders from different ethnicities 
to important positions in the new communist government.   
However, even Tito’s vigorous attempts to create a uniform society blind to 
ethnicity encouraged only 5.4 percent of the population of Yugoslavia to identify 
themselves as Yugoslav in the 1981 census.72  The Yugoslav ethnic category persists in 
Serbia’s latest census, with 1 percent of the population identified as Yugoslav in 2002.73  
Bosnia’s 1991 census reported 5.5 percent of the population as Yugoslav.  The census 
planned for 2011 will probably show a change in that percentage, however.74  Croatia’s 
2001 census did not include an ethnic category for Yugoslavs.75   
Even before declaring Croatia’s independence in 1991, Croatian nationalist and 
long time Yugoslav dissident Franjo Tuđman endeavored to “cleanse” Croatian society of 
any Serbian elements that had worked their way in during the Yugoslav years.  Active in 
Croatian resistance to the Yugoslav state, Tuđman made a name for himself as a 
nationalist and advocate of Croatian independence.  He persevered in his efforts to 
promote Croatian nationalism until 1990 when his Croatian Democratic Union party 
came into power with the help of an electoral system that allotted his party over 60 
percent of the seats in the Sabor (Croatia’s legislature) with only 42 percent of the vote.76  
Immediately voted President of Croatia, Tuđman came into office in May 1990 
with a plan for Croatia’s future.  In conversations with Warren Zimmermann, then the 
U.S. Ambassador to Yugoslavia, Tuđman communicated his dislike of the Yugoslav 
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federation and his intentions to create a new Croatian constitution, reform the economy, 
and fundamentally change the relationship between the Yugoslav republics and the 
central authority in Belgrade, the capital of Serbia and of Yugoslavia.77  Tuđman also 
observed that Serbs comprised only 11 percent of Croatia’s population, yet held 40 
percent of government positions.  Furthermore, Serbs essentially controlled the media 
and the police.78  Tuđman resolved to remedy the situation by driving ethnic Serbs out of 
public office, replacing them with ethnic Croats.  Other segments of society responded to 
Croatian nationalism by assisting in the “purification” of Croatian culture.  Anything that 
exhibited Serbian influence or that symbolized Yugoslavia became a target for 
elimination.  Librarians removed books written in Cyrillic or by Serb authors from public 
access, and works by Croat authors were prominently displayed and distinguished as 
authentically Croatian.79   
Tuđman made it a priority to fortify Croatian military forces to prepare for the 
possibility of a military confrontation with Serbia.  The Serb-dominated Yugoslav 
National Army (Jugoslovenska Narodna Armija, JNA) responded to Croatia’s declaration 
of independence in 1991 by attacking Vukovar and other locations in Slavonia.  Many 
ethnic Serbs residing in Croatia chose to join the JNA.  When the fighting ended in 
February 1992, Serb forces occupied approximately one-third of Croatia’s territory.80  
Croatia quickly set about its recovery, including reconstituting its fledgling military.  In 
1995, the Croatian army proceeded to oust Serb forces from Croatia, and in the process 
targeted not just Serb forces, but anything identifiably Serbian that they encountered.  
The Croatian military destroyed several Serbian Orthodox churches, religious libraries, 
and other significant artifacts of Serbian culture in Croatia.81 
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Efforts to “cleanse” Croatian culture from foreign influences extended to 
language as well, resulting in immediate changes to the Croatian used in publications.  
The Croatian used in news media and radio and television programs exhibited changes in 
word choice.  The state encouraged the media to eschew words of foreign origin in favor 
of Croatian terms.82  In some instances, newly coined words filled a gap in the lexicon 
previously filled by an adopted word of foreign origin.  In such cases, even terms 
commonly used throughout Yugoslavia were rejected due largely to the fact that many 
foreign words had been readily adopted by Serbia, making those words all the more 
distasteful to Croats.  The new words were not technically new, but revived after having 
been lost to common use with the advent of the joint language during the Yugoslav 
period (1918–1991).  Other terms were new, formed by drawing on older Croatian 
vocabulary, using words long neglected and giving them new meaning or combining 
them with other words to create new terms.83  The need to create new terms arose 
particularly in the areas of technology, where most new words come from the country 
that creates and exports new technology.  For example, “pure” Croatian does not include 
the cognate for computer.  While most language communities have elected to adopt the 
foreign word, as did Serbia, in Croatia the acceptable term is računalo, from the verb 
računati which means to count. 
The impetus to “purify” the Croatian language after securing independence came 
from the top down.  The changes in language exhibited in the media arose first and most 
consistently in the state–controlled media outlets.  Overtly nationalistic media outlets also 
quickly transitioned to more “pure” Croatian, while independent media adopted many of 
the changes but did so more slowly.84  The media even provided guidance on which 
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terms were most correct and warned against non-Croatian alternatives.85  Once the 
preoccupation of literary journals, a plethora of books and pamphlets emerged that 
instructed their readers on the proper use of language.  Books on the subject, such as Do 
We Speak Croatian Correctly?,86 offered assistance to the patriotic–minded that wished 
to speak “proper” Croatian, complete with dictionaries showing Croatian equivalents to 
Serbian words in popular use.  The changes prescribed by Croat nationalists prompted 
Serb linguistics professor Ranko Bugarski to describe the altered language as Newspeak, 
a reference to George Orwell’s novel 1984, in which language was manipulated and 
simplified by the state in an effort to control thinking.87 
Some argue that in fact the Croatian language has not changed.  Mario Grčević, a 
linguist and a humanities professor at the Croatian Academy of Sciences and Arts in 
Zagreb, insists that the Croatian language always remained distinct from Serbian.88  
Grčević claims that any changes apparent since Croatian independence result from a 
return to a more natural Croatian language that Yugoslav authorities had censored.  As 
evidence of this, Grčević cites examples of the destruction of books published using 
distinctly the Croatian language, and of prominent individuals suffering censure or even 
imprisonment for using Croatian words.  He furthermore compares a list of words he 
compiled from common Croatian news sources published from 1997 to 1999 with a 
similar list compiled by Croatian linguistics professor Milan Moguš from 1935 through 
the 1970s.  Grčević found that many of the words that Croats supposedly created or 
resurrected since Croatia’s independence were found in public use through the 1970s, 
though with decreased frequency attributable to censorship.  The distinctly Croatian  
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words censored by the Yugoslav government were relegated to a “passive” vocabulary–
never completely falling out of use by Croats but yielding to Serbian terms in the name of 
political expediency.89 
Croatia’s academic community has also exerted some leverage in favor of 
linguistic “purification.”  The Croatian Philological Society in Zagreb publishes a journal 
on the Croatian language titled Jezik (Tongue or Language).  The articles published in 
this journal often advocate a cleansing of the Croatian language.  Proceedings published 
in the journal from a conference on the Croatian language include a commentary by 
Croatian linguistics professor Milan Moguš in which he argues that changes to the 
language came from foreign influence, and that using “proper” Croatian is essential to 
promote clear communication.  On the words introduced from Serbian, Moguš compares 
the change and development of language to illness.  He states that “to develop does not 
have to mean only to progress and flourish, but develop might also mean to regress, 
because even illness spreads and develops.  This kind of development can mean 
regression of language because progress can be bad.”90  The comparison leaves no doubt 
as to his opinion on the use of words borrowed from other languages, though his 
argument that the loss of precision from using words that convey a slightly different 
meaning hinders communication is flawed.  In a technical or legal setting precision in 
communication can be vital and word choice can certainly have significant implications.  
However, as Croatia interacts increasingly with other countries, more precise 
communication often requires the use of terms from other languages. 
The fact that the public requires instruction on the most acceptable use of 
Croatian suggests that the changes introduced since Croatia’s independence arose from 
an artificial and directed source.  Grčević’s explanation of the revival of the Croatian 
language once it was unencumbered by censorship explains why Croatian words returned 
to more common use, but the rapid abandonment of Serbian words and the promotion of 
“pure” Croatian do not equate with a natural return to a suppressed but preferred 
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language.  The state promotion of “pure” Croatian reveals a political agenda that 
ironically resembles that of the Serb-dominated Yugoslav government as identified by 
Grčević. 
Common use of the Croatian language since independence provides another 
indicator of political tampering.  If the typical Croat had condescended to eliminate 
distinctly Croatian terms from his speech for the sake of political correctness, surely the 
return to using Croatian speech would have been spontaneous and widespread.  In 
practice, that was not the case.  A survey conducted to determine public views of correct 
language revealed that respondents were generally conscious of changes to language and 
elected based on individual circumstances either to adapt their language to the new, 
politically endorsed standards or to continue to speak as they always had.91  Those that 
responded strongly in favor of Croatian words did so when choosing between Croatian 
and Serbian alternatives, and were less critical of foreign words not of Serbian origin.92 
As might have been expected, older respondents were less likely than younger 
respondents and current students to select “pure” Croatian words as more correct.93 
In spite of efforts to significantly differentiate Croatian from Serbian, many 
elements of the joint Serbo-Croatian language persist in Croatia today.  Making a point to 
speak “pure” Croatian appears important to journalists, teachers, politicians and others in 
public positions in order to demonstrate their loyalty and correctness, but it comes across 
as excessively formal and stilted in every day settings.94  Which changes introduced to 
the Croatian language since independence will become permanent remains to be seen. 
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B. LANGUAGE USE IN SERBIA 
The language situation in Serbia today is probably less complicated than that in 
Croatia or Bosnia, though not without political issues.  Serbia’s strong literary tradition at 
the time of the formation of the joint Serbo-Croatian language meant there was no need 
to establish a language identity in Serbia after Croatia seceded.  Overall, there has been 
little change to Serbian since the dissolution of Yugoslavia.95  Nevertheless, three distinct 
camps, identified by Robert Greenburg in his research on the death of Serbo-Croatian, 
emerged in the 1990s to advocate changes in different directions for the future of the 
Serbian language.96 
The first group consists of linguists who argue that the joint literary language 
established via the Novi Sad Agreement in 1954 provided a sound basis for the Serbian 
language and should be perpetuated using the eastern, or ekavian, variant of the štokavian 
dialect already prevalent in Serbia.  This argument essentially promotes the status quo.97  
The other two groups exhibit greater nationalistic sentiment and propose changes to the 
language.  The members of the second group, identified by Greenburg as Neo-Vukovites, 
suggest a return to the standards proposed by the practically legendary language reformer 
Vuk Karadžić during the middle to late 1800s.  This would involve adapting the language 
of Serbia to the ijekavian dialect more prevalent to the west in Bosnia and Croatia.98  The 
third group exhibits the most nationalistic sentiments of the three, recommending a return 
to the Serbian language before the creation of a joint language.  Supporters of this agenda 
assert that the joint language was never legitimate, and they claim that the štokavian 
dialect and Cyrillic alphabet are inherently Serbian.  Conversely, they consider the Latin 
alphabet anathema, and even recommend reincorporating letters from the Slavonic 
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alphabet into modern use.99  The academic debate in this regard continues as evidenced 
by a meeting in the fall of 2009 of prominent Serb linguists to discuss the perceived 
absence of language policy in Serbia.  Their concern led to the creation of a new Council 
for Language within the Vuk Foundation, a cultural institution named in honor of Vuk 
Karadžić.100 
The treatment of the Cyrillic alphabet has perhaps represented the most 
significant issue facing the Serbian language since 1991.  Because Cyrillic was developed 
as a means to translate religious texts into the early Slavic language, Cyrillic maintains a 
close relationship with the Serbian Orthodox Church.  The Serbian Orthodox Church also 
represents Serbian culture.  The Church became autocephalous in the 14th century A.D. 
and took a prominent role in political matters of the Medieval Serbian Empire.101  The 
close ties to a national religion and the long history associated with the height of Serbia’s 
power incorporated the Cyrillic alphabet into the Serbian national identity. 
Using a Cyrillic alphabet seems increasingly out of place in the 21st century.  
Global communication has increased exponentially in the last century, conducted 
predominantly in English.102  Some former republics of the Soviet Union are choosing to 
abandon Cyrillic alphabets in favor of Latin–based alternatives.  The inspiration for such 
changes is partly political, because it represents a final severing of ties with the Soviet 
Union; but it has practical advantages as well.  Kazakh officials cite the greater ease of 
integrating with the global economy as an impetus to change to a Latin–based 
alphabet.103  A similar trend in Serbia to adopt the Latin–based alphabet used extensively 
throughout Yugoslavia came about as a practical matter because it facilitated 
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communication with the rest of the world.  The eventual proliferation of Cyrillic 
typewriters and computer fonts, however, removed some of the incentive to convert 
alphabets.104 
Amid the debate in Serbia over the appropriate alphabet, the organization Ćirilica 
has arisen to promote and preserve the Cyrillic alphabet in Serbia.  Through its website105 
and the publication of numerous booklets on the subject, Ćirilica argues that Serbia has 
one national language and should therefore have one national alphabet, that the Cyrillic 
alphabet is in danger of extinction, and that Serbs should protect that alphabet.106  This 
campaign appears to have had little effect on alphabet choice in Serbia.  State–affiliated 
media publish by default using Cyrillic, but provide the same content using both 
alphabets on their internet sites.  Media outlets more closely tied to Western Europe or 
that are critical of the government tend to publish using the Latin alphabet. 
The debates on the future of the Serbian language remain academic and gain 
considerably less traction among serving politicians compared to the corresponding 
debates in Croatia.  In lieu of debating over how they write and speak, the general 
population of Serbia seems content to continue with established practices.  Consequently, 
in marked contrast to the tone in Croatia, Serbia readily embraces foreign influences on 
its language.  The reason for Serbia’s acceptance of foreign words derives from the early 
development of the language.  While the Croatian linguistic community always remained 
centered in Zagreb, the center of the Serbian linguistic community shifted between Novi 
Sad and Belgrade.  Moreover, rural areas of Serbia and Bosnia have exerted varying 
degrees of influence on standard Serbian since the early efforts of Vuk Karadžić to use 
the language of the common Serb as the standard for the literary language.   
The shifting of literary influence in Serbia and the failure to develop a common 
standard permitted German, Hungarian and Turkish elements in particular to leave 
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impressions on Serbian.107  Belgrade’s role as the capital of Yugoslavia also introduced 
more foreign influences on Serbian, because a significant proportion of Yugoslavia’s 
interactions with other countries took place there.  Even before the breakup of 
Yugoslavia, linguists observed the contrast between (a) the tendencies of the Serbian 
language to readily accept foreign words into its lexicon and (b) efforts to “purify” the 
Croatian language.108  The ready acceptance of foreign influences has given a greater 
international flavor to Serbian.109 
Serbia has experienced its greatest challenges with language in Vojvodina and 
Kosovo.  The latter declared independence from Serbia in 2008. Both Vojvodina and 
Kosovo enjoyed varying degrees of autonomy as provinces of Serbia throughout most of 
Serbia’s existence as a state.  A significant population of ethnicities other than Serb also 
resides in each territory, each with its own mother tongue.  Ethnic Albanians presently 
comprise over 90 percent of the population of Kosovo.110 The proportion of ethnic Serbs 
in Kosovo began to decline in the 1960s and then dropped precipitously after Kosovo 
became in essence a “protectorate” of the United Nations in June 1999 under the auspices 
of UN Security Council Resolution 1244.111 
Vojvodina, on the other hand, is home to a greater number of ethnicities, making 
the language environment there rather dynamic.  Ethnic Serbs comprise the majority of 
the population, but they share the province with large numbers of ethnic Hungarians and 
                                                 
107 Dragoljub Petrović, “Languages in Contact: Standard Serbian Phonology in an Urban 
Setting,” International Journal of the Sociology of Language 151 (2001): 20. 
108 Ranko Bugarski, “Sociolinguistic Issues in Standardizing Linguistic Terminology,” Language 
in Society 12, no. 1 (March 1983): 66. 
109 Ibid., 37. 
110 Statistical Office of the Republic of Kosovo, “Demographic Changes of the Kosovo 
Population 1948 – 2006,” Republic of Kosovo Ministry of Public Administration, http://www.ks-
gov.net/ESK/eng/ index.php (accessed January 15, 2010). 
111 Freedom House, “Freedom in the World 2009–Kosovo (Serbia),” July 16, 2009,  
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4a6452a8c.html (accessed February 4, 2010). 
  
 42
Croats along with Romanians, Roma, Bunjevci and Ruthenians.112  Challenges arise for 
speakers of minority languages to gain access to education, news, and government 
information in their primary language.  State media outlets that previously subsidized 
publication in minority languages have undergone privatization and can no longer justify 
the expense.  The sizeable ethnic Hungarian population in Vojvodina therefore takes 
upon itself the responsibility to provide education and other services in Hungarian. 
The Hungarian population is sufficiently concentrated in some cities to prompt 
dramatic change in local conditions.  In Subotica, the second largest city in Vojvodina, 
public schools that are required to teach Serbian also offer Hungarian as an elective.113  
In Stara Moravica, ethnic Serb parents that want their children to study in their native 
Serbian must send them to a school in another town, as the public schools in Stara 
Moravica hold classes in Hungarian.  The local population in Stara Moravica furthermore 
implemented plans to replace the remaining dual language street signs with signs written 
solely in Hungarian, and to rename many streets after figures from Hungarian history 
rather than Serbian history.114  The language policy of Vojvodina’s ethnic Hungarian 
population poorly serves the primary school students.  Because they do not gain a solid 
foundation in Serbian, the students struggle to adapt to life in Serbia outside their ethnic 
community, where Serbian is the standard.  The lack of a bilingual education hobbles 
ethnic Hungarian citizens of Serbia in their search for employment and advanced 
education in Serbia, and ultimately further widens the gap between the ethnicities.115   
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Groups that promote the Serbian language for nationalistic purposes complicate 
matters in Vojvodina by insisting on the use of Serbian for official activities.  The 
linguistic organization Ćirilica proposed in September 2008 that official communications 
in Vojvodina take place in the Serbian language using the Cyrillic alphabet, with 
allowance for translation into other languages and scripts as allowed by law.116 The 
primary target of the proposal, however, was the favored use of the Latin alphabet by 
ethnic Croats and some Serbs in Vojvodina. 
In Kosovo, the only threat to Serbian is the dearth of people who wish to speak it.  
Since the UN assumed responsibility for Kosovo in 1999, and since Kosovo’s declaration 
of independence in February 2008,117 many ethnic Serbs have left the territory and few 
have returned.  Events in the 1990s leading to the present circumstances in Kosovo 
revealed that radical nationalistic Serbs sought to influence the political outcome in 
Kosovo based on its place in Serbia’s medieval history. Serb nationalists revived 
accounts of the 1389 battle of Kosovo Polje, in which invading Turkish forces clashed 
with the Serbian armies and killed their leader, Prince Lazar.  The Serbs eventually 
became subjects of the Ottoman Empire, and the battle has served as a symbol marking 
the beginning of over 500 years of Ottoman rule over Kosovo.118  For Serbs, Kosovo 
became a symbol of the kingdom that they had lost, and the battle represented the Serbs’ 
sacrifices for their people and for Christianity as well as the beginning of repression at 
the hands of the Turks.  Kosovo Albanians, a majority of whom are Muslim, came to be 
viewed as accomplices of the Turks. 
Serbian authorities continue to refer to Kosovo by its older name “Kosovo and 
Metohija.”  Metohija was a region of Orthodox monastic estates in the southwest of 
Kosovo.  Slobodan Milošević invoked the battle of Kosovo Polje in April 1987 when, as 
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chairman of Yugoslavia’s Central Committee of the Communist Party, he addressed a 
prearranged gathering of Serbs in Kosovo.  The speech and choreographed news 
coverage sparked nationalistic sentiments throughout Serbia.119  Patriotic Serbs also 
referenced the history of their language, and many books published in the 1990s 
manifested nationalistic rhetoric intended to inspire patriotism among the citizens of 
Serbia.  The Oldest Language of the Bible, originally published in 1929, was brought 
forth again in a new edition.120  It celebrates the old Church Slavic origins of the Serbian 
language. 
Advocates of harkening to the past to find a direction for the Serbian language 
have continued their efforts.  Serbia’s leaders remain steadfast in their assertion that 
Kosovo is a province of Serbia.  However, the drive to join the European Union and the 
continuing international presence in Kosovo preclude Serbia from launching another 
attempt to claim it by force. 
C. LANGUAGE USE IN BOSNIA 
East and West still collide in Bosnia, as they have throughout its turbulent history.  
Parts of Bosnia fell at different times under the control of Romans, Bulgarians, 
Hungarians, Croats, Serbs, and Ottomans.121  Once an example of multiculturalism and 
religious and ethnic harmony, after gaining independence in 1992 Bosnia fell victim to 
politically manufactured hatred and violence that drastically changed its political and 
demographic landscape.   
Bosnian Serbs took exception to calls for Bosnian independence.  They instead 
declared the independence of ethnic Serb–controlled areas which they called Republika 
Srpska, boycotted the vote on independence, and proceeded to violently consolidate  
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ethnic Serb–controlled territories.  To understand the Bosnian Serb point of view, Phillip 
Corwin, an American who served as a UN chief political officer in Bosnia, recommended 
the following thought experiment:  
I am fond of asking my European and North American (Christian and 
Jewish) friends who are so emotionally pro–Bosnian: if tomorrow you 
were told, through no decision of your own, that you were no longer a 
citizen of your own country, but were now a member of a minority in a 
Moslem country that had never before been a country, [and] that had been 
a Nazi collaborator during World War II, what would you say?  Without 
exception, they answer the equivalent of ‘No way!’122 
The response of ethnic Serbs and ethnic Croats was the same.  Bosnia descended into war 
between ethnic Serbs and Bosniaks, and between ethnic Croats and Bosniaks, until a 
peace agreement was brokered in Dayton.   
The Dayton Accords also created a new state, incorporating in its constitution 
guarantees of equality and fairness for the main ethnic communities.  The compromise 
that allowed the successful conclusion of the peace also enacted a de facto partition of 
Bosnia into two entities—the (Bosniak and ethnic Croat) Federation of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (FBiH) and the (ethnic Serb) Republika Srpska.  FBiH was further divided 
into ten cantons, the majority of which contain a majority of one or the other ethnicity 
with little mixing of the Bosniak and ethnic Croat populations.   
The presence of three main ethnic communities complicates the language 
situation in Bosnia, because each tries to assert its unique identity and to exercise 
authority over its own affairs.  Bosnian Croats endeavor to associate themselves with 
Croatia, and Bosnian Serbs likewise look to Serbia.  Moreover, the death of Yugoslavia 
brought also the death of Serbo-Croatian, leaving Bosnia with no language of its own.  
While the ethnic Croats and ethnic Serbs of Bosnia insisted that they would speak the 
language of their own respective ethnicity, approximately half the population was left 
with no mother tongue.  The solution was a Bosnian language. 
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During the Yugoslav years (1918–1991), language was not a concern in Bosnia.  
The Serbo-Croatian spoken in the Bosnian republic of Yugoslavia was not identical to 
that spoken in Belgrade or Zagreb.  However, the minor differences in language proved 
irrelevant.  Everyone could understand what he heard and read and paid little heed to 
dialect or variant.  In the present environment of heightened awareness of cultural and 
ethnic identity, with the powerful impetus to emphasize the uniqueness of each culture, 
language use is no longer just about communication; it is about identity. 
The desire of ethnic Serbs in Republika Srpska to emphasize their Serbness 
presents a dilemma.  The ekavian variant of the štokavian dialect predominates in the 
eastern part of the former Yugoslavia, corresponding approximately to Serbia.  In the 
west and throughout Bosnia, including Republika Srpska, the primary variant is 
ijekavian.  In 1993, Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić mandated that Bosnian Serbs 
use the ekavian variant in order to differentiate their language from that employed by 
Bosniaks and ethnic Croats.123  Karadžić found this politically expedient because Serbs 
in Serbia proper spoke ekavian while Bosnian Serbs mostly spoke the same ijekavian as 
everyone else in Bosnia.  The push for Bosnian Serbs to speak and write like their ethnic 
cousins in Serbia continues, with all products and publications from the Republika Srpska 
government prepared in the ekavian variant using the Cyrillic alphabet.  Serbia has 
assisted Republika Srpska by sending linguists to universities in Bosnia to develop 
Serbian language curricula.124 
Bosnian Croats face a challenge similar to that of Bosnian Serbs.  The best 
employers and the best schools in Croatia take into account how well the applicant’s 
language conforms to the standards of “pure” Croatian.  The effects of these concerns 
appear starkly in the formerly multiethnic city of Mostar.  Previously a shining example 
of ethnic and religious acceptance, Mostar was home to a rather heterogeneous 
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population of ethnic Croats, Muslims125 and ethnic Serbs, with no ethnicity constituting a 
majority.126  Mostar’s population underwent a tremendous shift when, in late 1992, the 
ethnic Croat forces that had been cooperating with Bosniak forces in fighting Republika 
Srpska turned against their ally and began attacking Bosniaks.127  Bosnian Croats also 
attempted to form their own autonomous region, Herceg Bosna. 
After the war ended, Bosnian Croats continued their efforts to drive away 
Bosniaks from areas with a Croat majority, particularly Mostar.128  The lingering effects 
of the war and its aftermath resulted in the subsequent segregation of the Bosniak and 
ethnic Croat populations of Mostar in every respect, including the education system.  
When it was safe to return to school, students did not necessarily return to their previous 
school, but to the school on “their” side of the Neretva River that flows through the city.  
Students therefore attend schools segregated by ethnicity.  This arrangement allowed 
instruction in the language and curricula preferred by each ethnic group, further 
entrenching each ethnicity in its own communities and practices.   
International organizations working to repair the damage inflicted on Bosnia 
recognized that separate schools would only perpetuate ethnic divisions.  Hence, the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) pursued education reforms, 
and the possibility of future accession to the European Union was associated with 
progress toward meeting EU standards.129  The standards called for integration of school 
systems in localities where Bosniaks and ethnic Croats attended different schools.  
However, in localities where schools did combine at the OSCE’s urging, as in Mostar, the 
                                                 
125 The term Muslim refers to the Muslim Slav population of Bosnia as identified as an ethnicity 
during the Yugoslav period.  Since independence that ethnic group is commonly identified as Bosniak.  
126 Sumatra Bose, Bosnia after Dayton: Nationalist Partition and International Intervention (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 100. 
127 Noel Malcolm, Bosnia – A Short History (New York: New York University Press, 1994), 
252–6. 
128 International Crisis Group, Bosnia: A Test of Political Maturity in Mostar (Sarajevo/Brussels: 
International Crisis Group, July 27, 2009), 3. 
129 Azra Hromadžić, “Discourses of Integration and Practices of Reunification at the Mostar 
Gymnasium, Bosnia and Herzegovina,” Comparative Education Review 52, no. 4 (2008): 544. 
 48
students remained divided within the school, each ethnic group adhering to separate 
curricula and receiving instruction in its “own” language.130 
Just as political leaders manufactured the conditions for ethnic segregation, 
teachers, administrators, and parents perpetuate the ethnic division of students in Mostar.  
Ethnic Croats appear to support this segregation more than Bosniaks.  In interviews with 
researcher Azra Hromadžić, some Bosnian Croat students revealed a lack of concern 
regarding ethnicity reminiscent of the attitude prevalent before the 1992–1995 civil 
war.131  On the other hand, many ethnic Croat students readily accepted segregation from 
Bosniaks, but chiefly for practical reasons.  Association with Bosniaks might lead to 
corruptive language habits and thereby jeopardize an ethnic Croat’s chance to gain 
acceptance at a university in Croatia.132 
Bosniaks, meanwhile, express an openness to conciliation and a desire to integrate 
and cooperate.  However, Bosniak students acknowledged ulterior motives.  In their 
view, Bosniak teachers intend to gain what advantage they can from integration with no 
intention of achieving reconciliation.133 This attitude reflects the perception common 
among Bosniaks that ethnic Croats have generally fared better despite having initiated the 
1993 conflict between these ethnic groups.134  The ethnic tensions do not promote 
political reconciliation or cooperation in the realm of language.   
Does the Bosnian language really even exist?  The debate on the existence of a 
distinct Bosnian language predictably finds supporters among ethnic Bosniaks and 
detractors among Croat and Serb commentators.  Croat and Serb linguists prefer to 
identify the language of Bosniaks (not of Bosnia) as Bošnjački (Bosniak), which 
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associates the language with the Bosniak people, just as Croats speak Croatian and Serbs 
speak Serbian.  Croatian linguist Daibor Brozović has opined that, even though Croats 
might recognize the language as Bosniak, it is the right of the people to call their 
language what they wish.135  Serb linguist Vladislav Sotirović postulated that the mere 
announcement of a Bosnian language does not make it so.136  Another Serb linguist, 
Branislav Brborić of the Center for Applied Linguistics in Belgrade, did not even deign 
to call Bošnjački a language, but declared it only an idiom of the Serbian language.137 
Politics aside, Bosnia does have a literary tradition separate from Croatian and 
Serbian, even if not as old or as well developed.  Muslim Slavs followed Turkish culture 
during the long Ottoman rule over Bosnia.  Turkish, Arabic, Persian and Slavic were 
spoken in different settings.  A unique Cyrillic alphabet, Bosančica, came into use by 
Bosnians regardless of religious affiliation.138  In 1890, the Austro-Hungarian 
administration sanctioned a Bosnian grammar text with the intention of promoting 
Bosnian solidarity at the expense of Serbian nationalism.139 However, Serbo-Croatian 
was still commonly accepted as the language standard of Bosnia.  Neither the 1850 
Literary Agreement nor the 1954 Novi Sad Agreement addressed a language for Bosnia 
other than the joint Serbo-Croatian language. 
Senahid Halilović published an orthography of the Bosnian language in 1996, 
announcing the existence of a Bosnian language that differed sufficiently from Croatian 
and Serbian to warrant its own designation.140  In 1998, Bosnia’s Ministry of Education, 
Science, Culture and Sport sponsored a conference in Bihać along with Bosnia’s Institute 
for Language and Literature to discuss the status and future of language in Bosnia.  This 
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meeting represented the first concerted effort to discuss the status and distinctions of a 
Bosnian language.  The meeting exhibited a nationalistic tone, with arguments presented 
on the case for a language of the people of Bosnia, and for active language planning to 
differentiate the language of Bosnia from that of Croatia and Serbia.141   
In the absence of language planning purposefully designed to maximize the 
differences among the languages, the joint Serbo-Croatian standard would remain and 
serve as a possible bridge to heal the wounds inflicted in the wars of Yugoslav secession.  
Even with the efforts to differentiate each language, analysts have determined that the 
distinctions are largely superficial and serve only to identify association with an ethnic 
community.142 
Bosniaks will continue to argue for the legitimacy and distinctiveness of the 
Bosnian language.  The recognition of Bosnia and Herzegovina by the international 
community lends the language legitimacy.  Even outside Bosnia, the OSCE facilitates 
education in Bosnian for the Bosniak minority in Kosovo, where most education is 
delivered in Albanian.143  But the language debate in Bosnia reflects greater challenges.  
It serves as one more field of competition between the ethnic factions.   
The consequences of linguistic nationalism affect Bosnia more than Croatia and 
Serbia because of the still heterogeneous population in Bosnia.  Clinging to vestiges of 
national identity and promulgating them through education and fractured governmental 
organizations only exacerbate the politics of division in Bosnia, making reconciliation 
and progress toward meaningful reform practically unobtainable.  The implications for 
Bosnia’s future unity are ominous. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
“A language is a dialect with a navy and an army.”144 
 
Nationalism remains a potent force in the Balkans today, though not as virulent as 
witnessed in the 1990s.  The nationalism that brought about the union of Southern Slavs 
in Yugoslavia was checked, but not halted, by that union.  Yugoslavia’s advocates hoped 
their interests would be better addressed when the Slavic ethnicities banded together.  
However, traces of ethnic nationalism survived in Yugoslavia despite the efforts of each 
of Yugoslavia’s leaders to suppress it.  The forces that brought Serbs, Croats, Slovenes 
and the other ethnicities of Yugoslavia together overcame nationalistic tendencies, but 
latent nationalism remained sufficiently potent over the 73 years of Yugoslavia’s 
existence to eventually wreak havoc on that state when stoked and manipulated by 
opportunistic leaders.145  The momentum gained by nationalism did not abate after 
Yugoslavia dissolved, but gained legitimacy in the eyes of each ethnicity and justified the 
further pursuit of self-serving goals.   
The prestige associated with a national language follows naturally from efforts to 
assert a national identity.  As an instrument in the politics of identity, language gained a 
prominent role in the successor states of the former Yugoslavia.  Each new Balkan state 
used language in a similar manner in promoting nationalistic aims.  The freedom of 
expression afforded by independence in Croatia provided the opportunity to pursue all 
things distinctly Croatian, including the “cleansing” of the national language to purge 
non-Croatian influences.  In Serbia, abandonment of the joint language permitted 
language-conscious groups to promote a return to Serbia’s historical roots, particularly 
emphasizing the Cyrillic alphabet.  The Bosniaks in Bosnia and Herzegovina also took 
advantage of the new state’s independence and declared that it had its own language.   
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That the different ethnic groups of the former Yugoslavia would manipulate 
language to serve their purposes comes as no surprise.  After past efforts to repress 
nationalism had little effect, Tito instead worked toward establishing a degree of 
autonomy for each ethnicity; and this opened the door to increased nationalism. The 
failure of the Yugoslav state ended any remaining suppression of national character and 
therefore provided the opportunity for each group to assert its identity.  Because language 
can serve as a component of national identity, the symbolism of language took priority 
and communication became ancillary.146 
The converse principle, that language can also identify the “others,” is equally 
true.  In the states that emerged from Yugoslavia, distinguishing one ethnic group from 
the “others” appears to have been a prime motivator for much of the manipulation of 
language since 1990.  Asserting the national language in Croatia underlined the 
distinction between Croats and resident ethnic Serbs.  In Bosnia, a physical separation of 
the ethnicities resulted from the use of force.  Bosnian Serbs implemented changes in 
language to further separate themselves from Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats, while 
Bosnian Croats sought to follow Croatia’s lead.  Bosniaks found themselves the odd 
group out with no language to call their own until they declared that Bosnian was a 
distinct language in its own right.  Each group determined that its identity, which had 
been weakened by fighting and in some cases by large population shifts, required 
strengthening.  Language manipulation served as a means to build a strong national 
identity, because language was one area in which each group could exercise control.   
The process of language planning continues in each state.  Bosnian, Croatian and 
Serbian share many characteristics from over a century of intermingling and efforts to 
bring the languages closer together. (This assumes that the Vienna Literary Agreement of 
1850 is a reasonable starting point for such efforts.)  Language activists can point to 
linguistic standards and reference materials that predate the joint Serbo-Croatian 
language to explain present-day changes.  Each language community seeks to depart 
                                                 
146 Josip Baotić, “The Language Situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” in Language in the 
Former Yugoslav Lands, ed. Ranko Bugarski and Celia Hawkesworth (Bloomington: Slavica, 2004), 117. 
 53
from the joint standard and to return to the point at which language integration efforts 
began with the 1850 Vienna Literary Agreement. 
Disagreements or miscommunications due to language clearly did not lead to the 
violence that dismembered Yugoslavia and rent Bosnia three ways.  To the contrary, in 
Bosnia, where the violence was greatest and the devastation most widespread, the 
inhabitants spoke in the most identical terms.  Language nevertheless played a significant 
role in Yugoslavia’s demise.  Politically motivated actors exaggerated minor differences 
and emphasized the nationalistic value of language and culture.147  The role of 
nationalistic politics in language manipulation becomes clear through observing general 
political trends in each state.  The nationalist Croatian Democratic Union (Hrvatska 
Demokratska Zajednica, HDZ) party pursued linguistic purity, but once a coalition led by 
the less nationalist Social Democrat–led party formed a new government in 2000, 
previously suppressed opposition to “purifying” the Croatian language moderated the 
politicization of language.  Likewise, the choice to use Cyrillic in Republika Srpska was 
mandated by Bosnian Serb leaders and not the result of an outpouring of Serb patriotism 
from the populace. 
Ongoing efforts to establish the autonomy and distinctiveness of the Bosnian 
language will include the publication of grammar textbooks and dictionaries to document 
language standards.  The process of compiling these works will confirm that Bosnian is 
quite similar to Croatian and Serbian.  However, this similarity need not complicate 
relations between Bosnia’s dominant ethnic groups.  Instead, it may foster an 
environment in which similarities and differences can be openly and amiably discussed 
for the purpose of understanding and enhanced cooperation.148 
Amidst the struggle to establish national identity, Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia must 
also fulfill the functions of a state.  As relatively small states, to successfully provide 
traditional state services they must overcome any remaining animosity for one another 
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and cooperate to resolve pressing problems. The united Yugoslavia was never an 
economic powerhouse; and the economy of each successor state has suffered the 
debilitating effects of war, the ongoing transition to privatization, and in 2009 the 
pressures of a global economic downturn.  The republics traded extensively within 
Yugoslavia, and as independent states they have demonstrated a recognition of the need 
to foster productive trade relations.149  However, protectionism prompted by a flagging 
economy in 2009 has particularly hurt these still recovering states that rely on Europe’s 
otherwise accommodating trade policies.150 
Organized crime and corruption have attained practically legendary levels in the 
Balkans and will require considerable cooperation to defeat.  Corruption has replaced 
nationalism as the major campaign issue in Croatia, and has dominated the debates 
leading up to the 2009 presidential elections.151  International trafficking of weapons, 
narcotics, and human beings have long given the Balkans a bad reputation. This has 
resulted in stricter entry requirements for travel throughout Europe from some locations 
in the Balkans.152  These factors combined make the former Yugoslav states much less 
attractive to foreign investors, further impeding economic recovery and development.153 
Residual disputes among the successor states of the former Yugoslavia also 
inhibit reconciliation and rehabilitation.  Croatia applied for accession to the EU in 2003 
and was accepted as a candidate state in 2004.  However, a border dispute with 
neighboring Slovenia, already an EU member, has threatened Croatia’s bid to join the 
EU.  Croatian president Ivo Josipović, elected in January 2010, is expected to work 
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toward EU membership for Croatia, a goal which reflects the sentiments of the current 
government. The Croatian parliament recently approved an agreement to submit the 
border dispute with Slovenia to international arbitration.  This agreement probably 
reflects a Croatian decision to yield to pressure from Slovenia in hopes of winning EU 
membership.154   
The status of Kosovo remains a continuing grievance in Serbia.  Kosovo became a 
de facto UN “protectorate” after NATO forces helped bring an end to the fighting 
between Serb forces and the separatist ethnic Albanian Kosovo Liberation Army in June 
1999.  Under the protection of the UN and NATO, Kosovo was able to create a 
government and in February 2008 declared independence from Serbia.  Serbia insists, 
however, that the provisions of UN Security Council Resolution 1244, which established 
the interim UN administration in Kosovo, also guarantee Serbia’s territorial integrity, and 
that Kosovo’s declaration of independence therefore violates international law.  Serbia’s 
current liberal, Harvard–educated Foreign Minister Vuk Jeremić set the matter in context 
when he declared that Kosovo is Serbia’s Jerusalem and that Serbia is not prepared to let 
it go.155  At Belgrade’s urging, the International Court of Justice agreed in December 
2009 to provide an advisory opinion regarding Kosovo’s 2008 unilateral declaration of 
independence.156   
Bosnia remains the most troubled of the three states.  The Dayton Accords 
enacted a de facto partition of Bosnia, recognizing (and thereby legitimizing) the 
Republika Srpska and also creating the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH).  
Along with substantial autonomy for each ethnicity, the provisions of the Dayton 
Accords ultimately permitted the main factions to get entrenched in their respective 
geographic regions.  The constitutional division of power between the federal 
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government and each entity in Bosnia was intended to provide for equal representation.  
It also created a large and cumbersome bureaucracy.  Bosnia’s federal government 
consists of the three members of the presidency and their staffs, 57 legislators, and 10 
ministers—all for a country of about 4.6 million people.  In addition, each entity has its 
own government and bureaucracy.  The large number of high–level government positions 
represents a significant drain on Bosnia’s already heavily burdened economy.   
Republika Srpska generally uses its latitude in conducting its own affairs to hinder 
efforts to consolidate power at the state level.  Prime Minister Milorad Dodik has been 
particularly vocal about asserting Republika Srpska’s sovereignty while simultaneously 
hindering the operation of Bosnia’s federal institutions.157  In October 2009, the United 
States and the European Union recommended reforms to Bosnia’s constitution to 
strengthen the central government.  In a protest against international intervention, 
Republika Srpska Prime Minister Dodik denounced the proposed constitutional reforms 
and withdrew from constitutional reform discussions, asserting that they favor FBiH at 
the expense of the Serb entity.158  Prime Minister Milorad Dodik’s handling of the matter 
clearly communicated the message that at least one Bosnian leader increasingly views 
international intervention in Bosnian politics as more of a burden than a benefit.159  
Instead of fostering an environment of cooperation and stability as intended, Bosnia’s 
constitution has served to make Bosnia dependent on external intervention for the 
continued peaceful coexistence of the three factions.160   
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160 Janusz Bugajski, “Balkan in Dependence?” The Washington Quarterly 23:4 (Autumn 2000), 
177–192. 
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The future of Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia appears to reside in more integral 
association with the European Union and the broader Euro–Atlantic community through 
NATO.  The new Balkan states became intimately familiar with NATO when the military 
forces of its members engaged in various peacemaking and peacekeeping missions in 
Bosnia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Kosovo, and Serbia through the 
1990s.  NATO and EU forces remain in Kosovo today, and NATO and EU forces have 
conducted missions in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and are currently 
operating in Bosnia.  These states now seek to join the same organizations that have at 
some times conducted military operations on their soil.  Croatia joined NATO in 2009, 
while Bosnia and Serbia are both members of NATO’s Partnership for Peace.  Croatia 
and Serbia have both applied for EU membership.  Although this turn of events may 
seem ironic, the EU and NATO were created in part to prevent the very problems that 
precipitated NATO and EU intervention in the Balkans.  Bringing these states into the 
fold, it is presumed, will foster better relations and prevent future conflict. 
Regardless of increased integration with European and Euro–Atlantic institutions, 
Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia will still face domestic political questions concerning 
language.  In Bosnia, questions about language have the potential to contribute to further 
disruption of progress toward economic and political reform, and in Croatia and Serbia 
language politics may alienate the minority language speakers of their populations and 
engender internal instability.  Sentiments such as those expressed in this comment in a 
Croatian linguistics journal serve only to perpetuate language politics: 
Whose concern is it to nurture and love the Croatian language, to deepen 
their knowledge of it, to prepare (and continue preparing) it so that it can 
respond to new challenges and survive in the linguistic mosaic of Europe 
and the world?  Whose responsibility is it?  I will answer: this concern is 
in some fashion for all institutions and individuals, all who have a mind 
and a heart.161 
 
                                                 
161 Mile Mamić, “Hrvatski se jezik voli znajem i srcem,” Jezik 56, no. 3 (June 2009): 101, 
translated by author. 
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Language concerns contributed to the destabilization of Yugoslavia, and they 
have the potential to foment discord in the future.  Where Serbo-Croatian once served to 
bring people together, the manipulation of language by elites has brought it into use as a 
weapon.  Current debates about language in Kosovo and contested regions of the Former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia also threaten to strain tense relations in each territory.  
The experiences with language in Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia may provide models to use 





This appendix contains the Glagolitic alphabet along with the Serbian and 
Croatian alphabets which are currently in use in Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia.  The Serbian 
and Croatian alphabets are presented in their respective orders. 
 
Figure 3.   Glagolitic alphabet162 
                                                 
162 Simon Ager, “Glagolitic alphabet,” Omniglot, http://www.omniglot.com/writing 




Figure 4.   Serbian and Croatian alphabets 
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